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Introduction
Since the 1980s, we have witnessed intriguing developments; despite the proliferation of greater exchange rate flexibility, international reserves-GDP ratios increased substantially.
Practically all the increase in reserves-GDP holding has taken place in developing countries, countries is provided by applying the Trilemma framework. To recall, the Trilemma states that countries can choose not more than two of the following three attributes: exchange rate stability, monetary independence, and financial integration [see Frankel (1999) and Obstfeld et al. (2005) ].
Developing countries that opted during the late 1980s for exchange rate stability, monetary independence and financial repression, embraced during the early 1990s growing financial liberalization. Mexico, Korea and other countries found that the Trilemma is alive and kicking;
greater financial integration made the quest for exchange rate stability and monetary independence unattainable, frequently resulting with deep financial crises, including the 1994-5
Mexican and the 1997-8 East Asian crises. Argentina chose during the early 1990s another Trilemma combination: exchange rate stability supported by a version of currency-board, and financial integration. As has been vividly illustrated by the crisis in the early 2000s, this configuration did not pass the test of time.
These crises illustrated the downside risk of financial integration and the temporariness and risks of fixed exchange rates. These developments also validate Diaz-Alejandro's 1985 conjecture: Good-bye financial repression, hello investment boom, to be followed by a costly financial crash. It also demonstrated the Mirage of Fixed Exchange Rates [dubbed by Obstfeld & Rogoff (1995) ], and the possibility that a pegged exchange rate is a trap in the era of greater financial integration [see Eichengreen and Masson (1998) , Eichengreen (1999 ), Frankel (1999 ;
The emerging configuration of developing countries in the aftermath of the 1990s crises has been growing managed exchange rate flexibility, greater monetary independence, and deeper financial integration. This raises two important questions: why should the countries affected adversely by exposure to hot money opt for greater financial integration, and how stable is this emerging configuration? I discuss both issues in Section 2, pointing out that globalization of trade set in motion forces that induce endogenous financial globalization, and that hoarding international reserves is a key ingredient enhancing the stability of the emerging configuration in an era of greater financial integration. While not a panacea, international reserves helps by providing several services which include: self insurance against sudden stops and capital flights; mitigating REER effects of TOT shocks; smoothing overtime the adjustment to shocks by allowing more persistent current account patterns; and possibly even export promotion, though the last service remains debatable due to possible coordination issues akin to competitive devaluations.
Section 3 discusses the possibility that the large increase in hoarding international reserves is a symptom of the emergence of a new global financial architecture, which is manifested in the proliferation of decentralized and less cooperative arrangements. The hoarding takeoff during the 2000s illustrates also the downside risk of the new global financial architecture: competitive hoarding akin to competitive devaluations. Section 4 closes with a discussion of challenges of evaluating and testing the patterns of hoarding international reserves.
Hoarding international reserves and the embrace of financial integration
A remarkable trend of the new configurations is that with few exceptions, countries stunned by the financial crisis during the 1990s opted to buffer their growing exposure to financial instability by hoarding international reserves, instead of reducing their financial integration. While the reserves/GDP of developed countries has remain trendless, that of developing countries increased substantially from the early 1990s, coinciding with the rapid financial integration of developing countries [see Aizenman and Lee (2007) including the direct opportunity cost in the form of the marginal product of public capital and/or the cost of external borrowing, and the quasi costs of sterilization [Calvo (1991) ].
However, the costs of sterilization have been seen so far as well below the perceived benefits of monetary stability and the wish to hoard international reserves. Not withstanding concerns about sterilization costs, Aizenman and Glick (2007) In the next section we will place the large hoarding of international reserves in the context of the possible emergence of a new financial architecture, a process that may also provide a possible explanation for recent trends in East Asia.
Hoarding international reserves and the emerging financial architecture
The big story of the global economy during the last sixty years has been changes in the global distribution of economic might, from a unipolar architecture dominated by the US during the mid part of the 20th century to a multipolar world, with a shifting distribution of economic growth. The unipolar architecture was dominated by the US centric economic organization:
leading currencies were pegged to the dollar, and the US dictated the global monetary policy under the Bretton Woods system, 1944-1970. These trends are illustrated in Figure 3 by using [Rose (2006) ].
An unintended consequence of a decentralized global architecture is frequently the greater exposure to coordination failure. Countries following export oriented growth strategies [described by Dooley et al. (2004) ] may end up with competitive hoarding to improve their competitiveness in the OECD countries [Aizenman and Lee (2006) ]. Arguably, one may reconcile both the mercantilist approach [Dooley et al. (2004) ] with the limited support of mercantilism in cross country regressions by taking the perspective of a hoarding game, where countries following an export oriented growth strategy, competing in the same third market (the US), may end up with competitive hoarding. 5 An example of such a game, akin to Johnson's classical (1953) tariff war model, is summarized in Figure 4 . In a world with symmetric EMs competing in similar industries, competitive hoarding tends to dissipate most competitive gains, leading to a 'Beggar-yourself' and excessive hoarding. In an asymmetric world, an emerging market with low enough cost of sterilization may win the hoarding war --its non cooperative outcome is superior to the cooperative one, akin to the 'Beggar-thy-neighbor' outcome of asymmetric Tariff Wars [see Aizenman and Lee (2006) ].
Specifically, we consider two Emerging Markets (EMs) H and F, exporting similar products to a third market, say the US. Hoarding more reserves by each EM would depreciate its real exchange rate, thereby improving its competitiveness vis-à-vis the other emerging market in third markets [i.e., the US]. H's net export is an imperfect substitute of F's export, and depends positively on its international reserve hoardings relative to F's international reserves position.
We assume that H and F would prefer higher exports, thus balancing the gain from export promotion against the costs of hoarding reserves. The optimal international reserves level in the absence of competitive hoarding is normalized to 1, and point O in Note that H is worse-off in the symmetric competitive Nash hoarding equilibrium -its welfare at point S is lower than at point O (the no competitive hoarding equilibrium). By symmetry, the same applies to F. Competitive hoarding dissipates any competitive gains in the symmetric case, reducing welfare due to the higher cost of carrying extra international reserves, implying a 'Beggar-yourself' outcome. It can be shown that greater substitutability between the exports of two countries magnifies the negative externality associated with hoarding international reserves, and that lower sterilization costs increase the 'excess reserves' associated with competitive hoarding.
In the asymmetric case, if H's sterilization cost is low enough relative to F's cost, H would win the 'hoarding war' --H's non cooperative outcome is superior to the cooperative one, and Japan to invest directly in China, in an attempt to minimize their losses in the hoarding game. 6 The hoarding model described above is a one shot game, yet its logic applies also in a multi period environment, where the success of export promotion at time t leads improvement in the current account at time t+1, inducing more reserves hoarding at time t+1, needed in order to slow down the real appreciation which tends to be the byproduct of export led growth strategy. The ultimate speed of the REER adjustment and the needed hoarding in each period is the outcome of a complex interaction between the speed of reallocation of resources from the declining sector to manufacturing, and the speed to which prices and wages adjust to market pressure [i.e., the duration of nominal and real rigidities]. All these issues deserve further investigation.
These observations may explain also the inability to find a robust economic role for the mercantilist approach in econometric specifications, as most of its effects tend to dissipate overtime. Competitive hoarding may also reflect coordination failure. If China is the winner by virtue of low sterilization costs and size, other Asian countries may be worse off. 7 It also suggests the possibility of gains from regional coordination, possibly in the form of regional funds, etc. China however, may be less eager to participate in such a fund compared to other East Asian countries. The competitive hoarding view is also consistent with the interdependence of the demand for international reserves among ten East Asian countries, reported by Cheung and Qian (2006) . They found that controlling for conventional variables explaining the hoarding of international reserves, a one dollar increase in international reserves by one country has been associated with an increase of about .6 dollars by the other nine 'peer countries.'
Concluding Remarks
I close the paper with a discussion of alternate interpretations of hoarding international reserves, and the challenges facing empirical research dealing with explaining the evolving patterns of international reserves. Diversification and agency problems The lack of deeper diversification of international reserves may be partially due to agency problems. Central banks may be 'loss averse,' as the cost of holding too few reserves may be much higher than the opportunity cost of international reserves [Aizenman and Marion (2003) ]. If Central Bank's loss aversion exceeds that of the representative consumer, a good case can be made for putting some of the international reserves into a 'future generation' fund, managed by the treasury or other agencies.
Exposure to latent domestic instability
To conclude, the profound increase in the hoarding of international reserves by developing countries during recent years is part of a complex puzzle of shifting global trends.
The quest for a unified theory and empirical specification of international reserves, while admirable, may not be feasible due to the pace of global changes. It is constructive to view observed patterns of international reserve hoardings as the aggregation of several motives, with time dependent weights. Taking such an eclectic approach, the first phase of the rapid hoarding of reserves in the aftermath of the East Asian crisis has been dominated by self insurance against exposure to foreign shocks. Countries stunned by the 1997 crisis hedged their growing financial integration with self insurance and aggressive hoarding of international reserves in the aftermath of the crisis. Yet, the self insurance against sudden stops and currency crises interpretation fails to account for the reserves buildup in emerging market countries after 2000. These recent hoarding terns may be better accounted by competitive hoarding, self insurance against latent domestic and external instability, and exposure to instability associated with growing weaknesses of Banks' balance sheets. 1 9 5 0 1 9 5 3 1 9 5 6 1 9 5 9 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 7 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 1 year Global GDP share us/world africa/world 
